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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 




This matter comes on before this court on the appeal of 
the United States from an order entered in the district court 
on June 13, 2001, disqualifying the United States 
Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
from representing the United States in this criminal 
prosecution for mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C.S 1341. 
The order also directed the Attorney General forthwith to 
appoint an attorney to represent the Government in the 
case and required the special attorney to advise the court 
by August 15, 2001, whether he or she intends to continue 
this prosecution. The district court effectively has stayed 
the June 13, 2001 order pending this appeal, and thus the 
Attorney General has not made the appointment. 
 
The background of this case is as follows. For some 
years, the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania has been investigating chop shops in the 
Philadelphia area. A chop shop dismantles motor vehicles 
that usually, though not always, are stolen so that the 
parts can be sold. Assistant United States Attorney Robert 
K. Reed has conducted the investigation, which obviously 
has been a major undertaking as the losses arising from 
the dismantling of thousands of motor vehicles have been 
about $40,000,000. 
 
In about 20% of the cases investigated, however, the 
vehicles actually were not stolen. Rather, their owners 
cooperated in their purported "theft" to avoid lease or loan 
payments. Inasmuch as insurance companies pay for the 
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lost vehicles, these consensual "thefts" are called 
"insurance give-ups." 
 
In 2000 and 2001 the Government investigated Whittaker 
for possibly engaging in an insurance give-up of his vehicle. 
In November 2000, a grand jury subpoenaed Whittaker, 
seeking samples of his handwriting and his fingerprints. 
Subsequently, he retained Samuel Stretton, a Pennsylvania 
attorney, to represent him. On November 30, 2000, 
pursuant to a grand jury subpoena, Whittaker was 
fingerprinted and photographed. 
 
At the same time the investigation apparently was 
culminating. On January 29, 2001, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
SS 10606 and 10607, Reed signed a letter addressed to 
approximately 300 people who owned cars that were 
dismantled in the chop shops to advise them of the 
progress of the investigation and to invite them to file victim 
impact statements or to make inquiry with respect to the 
case with certain specified Government personnel. 
 
Reed prepared the letter, but he did not send it 
personally. Rather, he provided a paralegal in his office with 
a list of persons whose vehicles had been dismantled. This 
list included persons the Government suspected had 
participated in insurance give-ups. Reed, however, 
instructed the paralegal not to send the letter to these 
suspects. Unfortunately, the paralegal erroneously sent the 
letter to everyone on the list, including Whittaker. 
 
As might be expected, Whittaker contacted Stretton 
about the letter. On February 11, 2001, Stretton wrote the 
assistant United States Attorney particularly assigned to 
Whittaker's case, Mark S. Miller, about the matter. 
Stretton's letter referred to Reed's January 29 letter and 
ended by saying "[w]ould you please call me." Miller, as 
requested, promptly called Stretton and told him that the 
January 29 letter was a mistake and that Stretton should 
disregard it. Then, on February 22, 2001, a grand jury 
indicted Whittaker for mail fraud, the victim being the 
Colonial Penn Insurance Company, which insured his 
vehicle and paid $25,664.50 to World Omni Financial Corp. 
on its lease balance. 
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Thereafter, Whittaker, through Stretton, moved to 
dismiss the indictment. After explaining the background of 
the case, his motion recited that: 
 
       6. The aforementioned [January 29, 2001] letter 
       provides information for Mr. Whittaker as a victim. 
 
       7. The United States Attorney's Office has therefore 
       exculpatory evidence that would demonstrate Mr. 
       Whittaker is a victim and is not and should not be a 
       Defendant. 
 
       8. Despite Mr. Reed's investigation and conclusions, 
       Mr. Whittaker is being charged and has a case pending 
       out of the same matter where he is charged as a 
       defendant by a separate United States Attorney in the 
       same office. 
 
       9. It is unfair for the United States Attorney's Office to 
       take the position that the Defendant is a victim and 
       not someone who is criminally culpable, and yet have 
       the same office take an entirely different position on 
       the same investigation. 
 
       10. The Defendant contends that the government is 
       acting in bad faith as a result . . ., and is acting in 
       violation of his right to due process pursuant to the 
       Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
       Constitution and respectfully requests that the charges 
       be dismissed. 
 
App. at 63-64. Significantly, the motion did not suggest 
that the January 29 letter caused Whittaker to take any 
action adverse to his defense such as discarding evidence 
prior to Miller's notification to Stretton of the mistake. Nor 
did the motion suggest that the Government used the letter 
for any improper purpose, such as to gain an interview with 
Whittaker to obtain incriminating evidence. Of course, as 
Stretton knew or should have known, the premise of the 
motion that the Government had evidence exculpating 
Whittaker was at best doubtful as Miller had told him 
before Whittaker's indictment that the letter should be 
disregarded. Moreover, Stretton never has produced any 
evidence to counter the Government's explanation that 
Reed's paralegal sent the letter erroneously. 
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The motion came on before the district court on May 24, 
2001. At that time Reed was the only witness who testified 
on the motion. He described the large scope of the 
investigation which already had led to about 60 convictions 
with many cases still pending. He stated that about 20% of 
the chopped cars were insurance give-ups. He explained 
the procedure that led to sending the victim notification 
letters, indicating that "I did not intend to notify -- I mean 
certainly it would have undermined what we were trying to 
do with respect to people that were potential targets or 
targets of our investigation." App. at 117. He testified that 
the fact that the letter went "to someone like Mr. Whittaker, 
it went to other people as well, as I indicated, inadvertently 
and totally by mistake is just what it was." App. at 118. He 
also said that he delegated "the task [of sending the letters] 
to a paralegal." Id. 
 
On further examination by the court and by Stretton, 
Reed acknowledged that the mistake in sending the letter 
could have been avoided. He also acknowledged that he was 
not aware of any letter the Government sent to Stretton 
correcting the January 29 letter. 
 
After Reed completed his testimony, Miller and Stretton 
stipulated that Miller orally advised Stretton that the letter 
was sent in error and that Miller never made a written 
response to Stretton's February 11, 2001 letter. However, 
the stipulation did not include any suggestion that Stretton 
asked for such a letter to supplement Miller's oral 
statement. 
 
The court then ruled on the motion to dismiss, holding 
that it would not dismiss the indictment "because I don't 
think it's outrageous conduct." App. at 137-38. The court, 
however, treated the motion to dismiss the indictment as a 
motion to disqualify the United States Attorney because it 
thought that there was "a very serious issue of professional 
conduct under, at a minimum, Rules of Professional 
Conduct 1.7, 1.8, 1.9," referring to Pennsylvania rules 
governing the conduct of attorneys. App. at 138. Thus, the 
court ordered that unless the Attorney General appointed a 
special prosecutor, the parties should file memoranda on 
the disqualification issue. Stretton then suggested that 
perhaps Pennsylvania Rule 4.2 also was implicated but that 
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he wanted "to emphasize to the Court that, despite the tone 
of my questions to Mr. Reed, I'm not alleging that he did act 
in bad faith." App. at 138. The court then agreed, saying "I 
certainly don't believe that he did act in bad faith." Id. 
Stretton and the court then agreed that there was no basis 
for disciplinary action to be taken against Reed and that he 
is a "fine person." Id. 
 
The district court disposed of the matter in its opinion 
entered June 13, 2001. See United States v. Whittaker, 201 
F.R.D. 363 (E.D. Pa. 2001). The opinion incorrectly started 
by indicating that "[b]ecause the same United States 
Attorney's Office regarded him a perpetrator and a victim of 
the same alleged insurance fraud, defendant Wayne 
Whittaker has filed a motion to disqualify that office for its 
ethical breaches." Id. at 365. This sentence was wrong for 
two reasons. First, of course, the United States did not 
regard Whittaker as a crime victim, but merely 
inadvertently sent him a letter identifying him as a victim 
and then, when Whittaker's attorney, Stretton, inquired 
about the letter, corrected the mistake. The district court 
certainly was well aware of these facts. Second, Stretton did 
not file a motion seeking Reed's or the United States 
Attorney's disqualification. Rather, the court, after raising 
the disqualification issue in colloquy with counsel at the 
May 24 hearing, on its own initiative converted Whittaker's 
motion to dismiss the indictment into a motion to disqualify 
the United States Attorney's Office, and Whittaker 
effectively joined in the court's motion. The court then 
continued its opinion stating that it had found no other 
case "presenting such extraordinary conduct." Id. 
 
The court subsequently indicated that Whittaker in his 
supplemental submission following the May 24 hearing, 
identified "no less than eight Rules of Professional Conduct 
which he believes the Government breached when its left 
hand called him a criminal and its right hand called him a 
victim of the same scheme," id. at 365, including violation 
of: 
 
       Rule 1.7, which generally bars conflicts of interest 
       (Whittaker contends that as the January 29 letter 
       purported to be helping him at the same time the 
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       Government was seeking to prosecute him, this 
       constituted such a conflict); 
 
       Rule 1.9, which bars a lawyer from taking a position 
       adverse to a former client in the same or a related 
       matter; 
 
       Rule 3.8, which outlines the professional 
       responsibilities of a prosecutor, and in particular Rule 
       3.8(a), which bars a prosecutor from bringing a claim 
       that he knows is `not supported by probable cause'; 
 
       Rule 4.1(a), which bars attorneys from making false 
       statements of fact to third persons (Whittaker 
       maintains that the January 29 letter's statement that 
       he was a `victim' constitutes a false statement 
       pursuant to this Rule); 
 
       Rule 4.2, which precludes contact with someone the 
       Office knew was `represented by another lawyer'; 
 
       Rule 4.4, which bars the collection of evidence by 
       methods that could compromise the rights of a third 
       party (Whittaker asserts that the letter constituted an 
       effort to obtain a statement in violation of this Rule); 
 
       Rule 8.4(c), which bars conduct involving 
       `misrepresentation'; and 
 
       Rule 8.4(d), which bars conduct `prejudicial to the 
       administration of justice'. 
 
Id. at 365-66. The court also pointed out that Whittaker 
cited Rule 3.7(a), which provides that "a lawyer shall not 
act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be 
a necessary witness," id. at 366, explaining that, apparently 
because of the January 29 letter, Reed might be a witness 
at the trial. Id. The court then set forth that Reed testified 
that the sending of the letter was inadvertent. Id. 
 
In its analysis, the court indicated that the Pennsylvania 
Rules of Professional Conduct were applicable by reason of 
28 U.S.C. S 530B(a), which provides that a Government 
attorney "shall be subject to State laws and rules . . . 
governing attorneys in each State where such attorney 
engages in that attorney's duties, to the same extent and in 
the same manner as other attorneys in that State." Id. The 
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court found, however, that there had not been violations of 
Rules 1.7 and 1.9. See id. at 368. But the court went on to 
say that "the never-retracted January 29, 2001 letter" was 
a "palpable falsehood" as the Government itself 
demonstrated by a May 31, 2001 letter, filed after the May 
24, 2001 hearing, explaining "its definitive position" that 
Whittaker "is a criminal." Id. Indeed, the district court said 
that it was not until it sent the May 31 letter that the 
Government "stat[ed] this conclusion." Id. Of course, the 
court's characterization of the January 29 letter as being 
unretracted until that time was inaccurate as, in 
conformity with Stretton's request, Miller had called 
Stretton before Whittaker's indictment and explained that 
the letter was erroneous and should be disregarded. 
 
The court then found that the January 29 letter was a 
"false statement of material fact" sent in violation of Rule 
4.1. See id. at 369. The court, however, relying on United 
States v. Balter, 91 F.3d 427 (3d Cir. 1996), held that Rule 
4.2 had not been violated. See id. at 370. 
 
The court also held that Rule 4.4 was not violated 
because "there is no evidence, for example, of the 
Government's using the January 29 victim letter to inveigle 
information or admissions from Whittaker, or of other 
malign purpose that might have approached 
outrageousness." Id. at 371 n.13. The court, however, 
found that there had been a violation of Rule 8.4(d), 
apparently partly because the United States Attorney's 
conduct in this matter had been "cavalier" and Reed had 
been amused when he testified at the May 24, 2001 
hearing. See id. at 370-72. In this regard, the court 
indicated that Whittaker had been on a roller coaster. The 
court said that : 
 
       We also know from AUSA Reed's concession, N.T. 46, 
       that Whittaker was not alone in riding this 
       Government-built roller coaster. While these other 
       target-victims are not before us, their existence 
       confirms the seriousness of the fiasco we consider here. 
       In its repeated unprofessional conduct, the Office has 
       here prejudiced the administration of justice and 
       undermined public confidence in a most sensitive part 
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       of our legal institutions. The United States Attorney's 
       Office thus transgressed RPC 8.4(d). 
 
Id. at 371.1 As far as we can ascertain, the court's reference 
to "repeated unprofessional conduct" simply meant that the 
United States Attorney erroneously sent the letter to other 
persons the Government thought were implicated in the 
offenses. 
 
The court next dealt with the remedy, indicating that it 
"found breaches of three Rules of Professional Conduct," 
meaning Rules 4.1, 4.3(c) and 8.4(d). Id. The court then 
cited In re Corn Derivatives Antitrust Litig. , 748 F.2d 157, 
162 (3d Cir. 1984), for its need to apply a balancing test in 
determining whether it should disqualify the United States 
Attorney. After discussing the parties' interests, the court 
said that "there can be no doubt that our interest in 
protecting the integrity of the proceedings and maintaining 
public confidence in the judicial system favors 
disqualification." Whittaker, 201 F.R.D. at 372. The court 
nevertheless went on to indicate that the Government acted 
"without bad faith or malintent [sic]" and that its "conduct 
is towards the lower end of the egregiousness spectrum for 
prosecutorial errors." Id. It held that the Government's 
"behavior . . . may bring our system into disrepute with the 
citizenry if the judiciary condones it." Id . It thus directed 
the Attorney General to appoint an attorney from outside 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to assume 
responsibility to prosecute this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 543. See id. at 373. 
 
The Government then moved for reconsideration, but the 
court denied the motion in a memorandum dated July 11, 
2001. See United States v. Whittaker, 201 F.R.D. 373 (E.D. 
Pa. 2001). We will not discuss the memorandum at length, 
but we do point out that in it the court clarified its reasons 
for finding that the Government's conduct violated Rule 
4.3(c), concerning situations in which attorneys are dealing 
with unrepresented persons. In particular, the court held 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. While other targets may have been on the roller coaster ride they 
apparently were not too troubled by it as, according to the United States 
Attorney's representation at oral argument, none has filed any motion 
seeking relief by reason of the receipt of the letter. 
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that the Government did not make a reasonable effort to 
correct the misunderstanding it created with the January 
29 letter merely by correcting it with the "oral 
representation to counsel." Whittaker, 201 F.R.D. at 377. 




As always, we first must consider jurisdiction. Plainly, 
the district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.S 3231. 
The matter of our jurisdiction is not so simple. The United 
States takes the position that we have appellate jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. S 1291 pursuant to the collateral order 
doctrine stemming from Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan 
Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221 (1949). On the other 
hand, Whittaker contends that we do not have appellate 
jurisdiction as this appeal is of a pretrial, rather than a 
final order. See Gerardi v. Pelullo, 16 F.3d 1363, 1369 (3d 
Cir. 1994). 
 
Ordinarily, a court of appeals does not have jurisdiction 
over an appeal from a pretrial order during the pendency of 
the proceedings in a district court. See Comuso v. National 
R.R. Passenger Corp., No. 00-1491, 2001 WL 1167268, at 
*3 (3d Cir. Oct. 3, 2001). Under the collateral order 
doctrine, however, a court of appeals has jurisdiction if: 
 
       (1) the order from which the appellant appeals 
       conclusively determines the disputed question; (2) the 
       order resolves an important issue that is completely 
       separate from the merits of the dispute; and (3) the 
       order is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final 
       judgment. 
 
Collinsgru v. Palmyra Bd. of Educ., 161 F.3d 225, 229 (3d 
Cir. 1998), quoting In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 958 
(3d Cir. 1997). Plainly the order meets the foregoing 
criteria. To start with, the order conclusively determines 
that the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania is disqualified in this case and cannot 
participate in its prosecution. Thus, the order was not 
tentative or subject to later revision as the conduct of which 
the district court complained already was ameliorated fully 
by the time the court disqualified the United States 
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Attorney. Thus, there is no possibility under the order that, 
depending upon future events, the district court might 
reconsider its position. 
 
Second, the order unquestionably resolves a 
jurisprudentially important issue completely separate from 
the merits of the dispute concerning whether Whittaker 
committed mail fraud, a charge to which he has pleaded 
not guilty. Moreover, the issue of whether the United States 
Attorney in the district of the prosecution may represent 
the United States surely is important, particularly in a case 
such as this in which the prosecution is part of a much 
larger criminal investigation.2 
 
Finally, the order almost certainly will be unreviewable 
later in this case. In the overwhelming majority of criminal 
cases in which, as here, the defendant pleads not guilty, 
the case ends either when the jury finds the defendant 
guilty or not guilty and, if guilty, the defendant is 
sentenced. The United States correctly concedes that it 
cannot appeal from a judgment of not guilty for 
constitutional reasons, and it ordinarily would not be able 
to appeal from a judgment of conviction and sentence, as it 
would be the prevailing party. See Forney v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 
266, 271, 118 S.Ct. 1984, 1987 (1998); Fong Foo v. United 
States, 369 U.S. 141, 82 S.Ct. 671 (1962). While we can 
conceive circumstances in which the United States could 
appeal, such as, perhaps, if the court enters a judgment of 
acquittal after a jury verdict of guilty, we do not regard 
such remote possibilities as undermining our conclusion 
that the order of disqualification effectively will be 
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.3 
 
We recognize, of course, that the Supreme Court has held 
that a criminal defendant may not appeal immediately from 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We do not suggest that this case would not involve an important issue 
if the prosecution here was unrelated to any other case. 
 
3. We are well aware that there is a certain risk in making appealability 
determinations on the basis of consideration of the future course of 
litigation. See Hensley v. Northwest Permanente P.C. Ret. Plan & Trust, 
258 F.3d 986, 994 n.3 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, however, inasmuch as this 
rather straightforward criminal case is likely to go down a well-traveled 
path, the risks are minuscule. 
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the pretrial disqualification of his attorney. But 
unquestionably if the defendant is convicted, he may raise 
the disqualification issue on appeal. See Flanagan v. United 
States, 465 U.S. 259, 266, 104 S.Ct. 1051, 1055 (1984) 
("[A] constitutional objection to counsel's disqualification is 
in no danger of becoming moot upon conviction and 
sentence."). Thus, the position of a defendant with respect 
to the disqualification of his attorney is materially different 
from that of the Government in a criminal case and 
Flanagan therefore is not controlling. 
 
We also recognize that when a court disqualifies counsel 
in a civil case, its order is not immediately appealable. See 
Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 426, 105 
S.Ct. 2757, 2758 (1985); see also Comuso, 2001 WL 
1167268, at *4. There, too, however, an appeal after final 
judgment is not precluded because "if the client obtains an 
unsatisfactory judgment with substitute counsel, the 
disqualification ruling may be challenged on appeal of a 
final judgment." Id. at 435, 105 S.Ct. at 2763. Accordingly, 
Richardson-Merrell is no more controlling here than 
Flanagan. 
 
Insofar as we are aware, we have not addressed the issue 
of whether the United States may appeal from an order 
disqualifying a United States Attorney from prosecuting a 
criminal case. The United States, however, cites three cases 
addressing the point, and all conclude that the United 
States immediately may appeal from such an order. See 
United States v. Vlahos, 33 F.3d 758, 761 (7th Cir. 1994); 
In Re Grand Jury Subpoena of Rochon, 873 F.2d 170, 173 
(7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Caggiano, 660 F.2d 184, 
189-90 (6th Cir. 1981). Whittaker does not cite any case 
holding to the contrary. 
 
We carefully have reviewed these cases and have 
concluded that we should join with them. As the court 
explained in Rochon after discussing Flanagan: 
 
       An order disqualifying government counsel in a 
       criminal case, however, is a different matter, for if it is 
       not immediately appealable, it is effectively 
       unreviewable. For example, in this case, if the grand 
       jury declines to issue any indictments, the government 
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       could not appeal because the case would be over. If the 
       grand jury does issue indictments and any defendants 
       subsequently are found guilty, the government, of 
       course, would not seek review. If, on the other hand, 
       any defendants were found not guilty, appellate review 
       of the district court's disqualification order would be 
       precluded by the double jeopardy clause. Thus, in the 
       only instance in which the government would want to 
       press an appeal, the district court's decision preventing 
       the [attorney general] from participating in the grand 
       jury investigation is unreviewable. 
 
Rochon, 873 F.2d at 173 (citation omitted). 
 
Finally, we point out that if we found that we did not 
have appellate jurisdiction, we could and would exercise 
mandamus jurisdiction. The situation here is like that in 
Vlahos in which the court, after concluding that the 
collateral order doctrine supported its jurisdiction, 
indicated that even if it had held differently, it would 
exercise mandamus jurisdiction because "the district court 
exceeded the boundaries of its lawful role by prohibiting the 
designated representatives of the Executive Branch from 
prosecuting this criminal contempt action." Vlahos, 33 F.3d 
at 762. In Hahnemann University Hospital v. Edgar, 74 F.3d 
456, 461 (3d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted), 
we said that a court "should grant [mandamus] only in 
extraordinary circumstances in response to an act 
amounting to a judicial usurpation of power." As will be 
seen, the Edgar circumstances justifying mandamus are 
present here. Nevertheless, we do not issue mandamus as 
it "should not be issued where relief may be obtained 
through an ordinary appeal." Id. In view of our holding 
under the collateral order doctrine, that is the situation 
here. 
 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
Our standard of review on an attorney disqualification 
issue includes both deferential and de novo elements. To 
the extent that the district court made factual findings, our 
review is for clear error, though in this case the historical 
facts are not in dispute. On the other hand, we exercise 
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plenary review to determine whether the district court's 
disqualification was arbitrary in the sense that the court 
did not appropriately balance proper considerations of 
judicial administration against the United States' right to 
prosecute the matter through counsel of its choice, i.e., the 
duly appointed United States Attorney. See United States v. 
Stewart, 185 F.3d 112, 120 (3d Cir.), cert . denied, 528 U.S. 
1063, 102 S.Ct. 618 (1999). If the disqualification was not 
arbitrary, we use an abuse of discretion standard in 
reviewing the court's decision. See id. In this case, however, 
the selection of the standards of review is not important as 
we would reach the result that there was no basis for the 
court to disqualify the United States Attorney regardless of 




It is perfectly clear that the district court had no basis to 
disqualify the United States Attorney in this case. The 
undisputed facts are that Reed did not intend that the 
January 29 letter be sent to Whittaker or any other person 
who the Government believed had cooperated in an 
insurance give-up. Unfortunately, a paralegal in his office 
did not follow his mailing instructions. But, as even the 
district court recognized, Reed acted in good faith. The 
worst thing that can be said about Reed in particular and 
the United States Attorney's office in general is that they 
were negligent. 
 
Significantly, Whittaker makes no claim that his receipt 
of the January 29 letter in any way prejudiced his defense, 
such as leading him to destroy exculpatory evidence upon 
its receipt. Moreover, the United States did not attempt to 
gain any tactical advantage from the letter as, for example, 
attempting to interview Whittaker after sending it. 
 
Notwithstanding the undisputed fact that the United 
States simply made a mistake in sending out the victim 
impact letters, the district court in an unjustified 
conclusion found that the United States through its 
attorney made "a false statement of material fact or law to 
a third person" in violation of Rule 4.1. Indeed, the district 
court went so far in its opinion as to label the section 
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dealing with Rule 4.1 as "The Government's Admitted 
Falsehood." Whittaker, 201 F.R.D. at 368. Of course, the 
letter should not have been sent, but this case involved a 
mistake, not a lie, and the district court certainly should 
have treated it in that way. In this regard, we point out that 
it is not unusual for parties in a judicial proceeding to 
correct mistakes. For example, every judge and attorney 
knows that pleadings and answers to interrogatories often 
are amended.4 In the circumstances, neither Reed nor his 
office violated Rule 4.1. 
 
The court also found that the United States Attorney did 
not comply with Rule 4.3(c), which provides that when a 
lawyer knows or reasonably should know that an 
unrepresented person misunderstands that lawyer's role in 
the matter, the lawyer should make reasonable efforts to 
correct the misunderstanding. Even though the 
Government knew that Stretton represented Whittaker, the 
district court treated Rule 4.3(c) as applicable to its direct 
communication with Whittaker, and we will accept this 
treatment of the rule on this appeal. What we cannot 
accept is the court's finding that the oral representation to 
Stretton that the January 29 letter had been a mistake was 
not a reasonable effort to correct the misunderstanding. 
While the court apparently believed that the Government 
should have sent a letter further explaining the error, that 
conclusion ignores the fact that on February 11, 2001, 
Stretton wrote Miller and requested that he "please call" 
him and Miller did exactly that. Thus, the United States 
corrected its mistake precisely as Stretton requested and, 
accordingly, complied with Rule 4.3.5 In sum, we reject the 
district court's findings that the United States Attorney did 
not make reasonable efforts to correct the 
misunderstanding it created by sending the January 29 
letter. 
 
We also reject the court's conclusion that the 
Government did not state "its definitive position" that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a) and 60(b)(1) deal with correcting mistakes. 
 
5. We do not hold that our result would have been different if Stretton 
did not request a telephone call. Rather, we simply predicate our result 
on the facts before us. 
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"Whittaker is a criminal" until it sent its May 31, 2001 
letter. The grand jury indicted Whittaker on February 22, 
2001, and he appeared in court and pleaded not guilty on 
March 8, 2001. Surely, by obtaining the indictment, the 
Government made clear, quite aside from its statement to 
Stretton to disregard the letter, that it considered Whittaker 
to be a criminal. Indeed, the only way the district court 
could have avoided this obvious conclusion would have 
been to believe that a run-a-way grand jury returned the 
indictment. 
 
Finally, the court found that the United States violated 
Rule 8.4(d) by its conduct "prejudicial to the administration 
of justice." Whittaker, 201 F.R.D. at 370-71. The court 
reached this conclusion because of what it deemed was the 
seriousness of the United States Attorney's "repeated 
unprofessional conduct," which the court believed 
"undermined public confidence in a most sensitive part of 
our legal institutions." Id. at 371. We reject this unjustified 
finding. The only thing the United States Attorney did was 
send a letter to Whittaker and to certain other persons by 
mistake. Moreover, we reiterate that it promptly clarified 
the situation when Stretton inquired about it. In the 
circumstances it is not true that the Government 
prejudiced the administration of justice. Indeed, we do not 
doubt that if the court simply had denied the motion to 
dismiss without converting it into a request to disqualify 
the Government's attorneys, these proceedings would have 
gone unnoticed. 
 
We recognize that the district court was concerned that 
Reed might be called as a witness at the trial. See id. at 
366, 379-80. While we do not intend our opinion to be 
regarded as an in limine admissibility ruling, we do state 
that it is questionable that the court, upon reflection, will 
permit Whittaker to elicit evidence regarding the January 
29 letter before a jury. The letter indisputably was sent in 
error and thus Reed did not send it because he had 
evidence exculpatory as to Whittaker. Accordingly, 
inasmuch as the trial concerns mail fraud it is difficult to 
understand how the letter could "make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 
action more probable or less probable than it would be 
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without the evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 401. Therefore the 
district court well may hold that if Whittaker attempts at 





This panel regrets having to file an opinion so critical of 
a district court. After all, the members of this panel have 
had more than 80 years of judicial service on the trial and 
appellate benches in the state and federal courts and 
recognize that a judge, like anyone else, can have a bad 
day. Here, however, the district court's unjustified view of 
this matter extended over a period of weeks during which 
it had an opportunity to reconsider its position, particularly 
when the Government moved for reconsideration. But the 
district court adhered to its unjustified conclusions, 
seemingly losing all sense of proportion. For the foregoing 
reasons, the order of June 13, 2001, will be reversed, and 
the case will be remanded to the district court for further 
proceedings.6 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In view of our conclusion, we need not consider issues addressed in 
the briefs of whether, and if so under what conditions, a court should 
disqualify an attorney for violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
or whether separation of powers considerations precluded the 
disqualification here. 
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